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Abstract
This essay offers an intermediate discussion of select policy, strategic, operational, and tactical
issues that demonstrate where and how the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s novel coronavirus
response on the one hand, and homeland security frameworks and research on the other,
converge or—more often so—diverge, and how to narrow this gap. Although typically framed
as a pandemic owned by the public health sector, the COVID-19 response falls directly within the
homeland security mission space, whose core missions include “Ensuring Resilience to Disasters.”
In some respects, Pennsylvania’s response exemplifies best practices suggested by research. In
other dimensions, it is neither in line with what research would recommend nor with what the
National Preparedness System would mandate. The Keystone State has yet to fully make the step
from disaster to catastrophe as the characteristic challenge to U.S. emergency management
in our century. Response to catastrophic crisis cannot be siloed; it requires adaptivity and an
inclusive approach to the community.
Keywords: catastrophe; COVID-19; disaster; national response framework; pandemic;
Pennsylvania; preparedness; resilience; whole-community approach
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As United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has pointed out, the “We Are All in This
Together” slogan also means that the COVID-19 situation exceeds the quality of a pandemic and
is a complex catastrophe.1 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has released
guidance for the management of concurrent emergencies in the evolving COVID-19 context.2
With its complex distributed political and organizational structure as a Commonwealth,
Pennsylvania faces many complexities and dilemmas in its response to COVID-19. This essay
offers an intermediate discussion of select policy, strategic, operational, and tactical issues that
demonstrate where and how the Pennsylvania response converges with and diverges from
homeland security frameworks and research and how to narrow this gap. Legal action and court
decisions related to the Pennsylvania state government’s COVID-19 response therefore are
beyond the focus of this analysis.3
Although typically framed as a pandemic owned by the public health sector, the COVID-19
response falls directly within the homeland security mission space, with its core mission no. 5
being to “Ensure Resilience to Disasters.”4 In fact,
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On March 19th [2020], FEMA’s role in the pandemic response changed. Under the direction
of the White House Coronavirus Task Force, FEMA moved from playing a supporting role in
assisting the U.S Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which was designated
as the initial lead federal agency for the COVID-19 pandemic response, to coordinating the
Whole-of-Government response to the COVID-19 pandemic.5

Core Characteristics of Pennsylvania’s
COVID-19 Response
The Commonwealth’s Department of Health activated its Department Operations Center
at the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency’s (PEMA) on February 1, 2020 and on
March 4, 2020, PEMA activated its Commonwealth Response Coordination Center, while
Governor Tom Wolf issued a “Proclamation of Disaster Emergency” on March 6, 2020.6 Before
COVID-19 containment action was taken, PEMA, assisted by the Pennsylvania Department
of Health, organized a pandemic planning event for all state agencies, with a workshop and
tabletop exercise to jointly address states of preparedness, potential impacts, and continuity
of operations planning.7 After that planning event, there was very little evidence of an all-ofgovernment approach coming from the Governor’s office.
Governor Tom Wolf’s operational response began on March 12 in Montgomery County, which
had seen an uptick in cases, with school closures and the request for non-essential businesses
to close and residents to limit travel. Early on, the Governor also successfully requested funds
from the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program to offset some of the economic impacts
of his evolving COVID-19 containment actions on small businesses.
As the situation evolved, the Governor used what he referred to as a “data-driven” countyper-county approach to lockdown (stay-at-home orders) and reopening, based on infection
trends and additional metrics such as contract tracing capability.8 The first counties were shut
on March 23, and Governor Wolf ordered a state-wide shut-down on April 1. The “Process to
Reopen Pennsylvania” then started on May 8.9 The phased approach to reopening was based
on metrics including but not limited to the infection-rate trend. It uses a traffic light-like color
scheme, where red means the stay-at-home and non-life sustaining business closure order
remains in effect, yellow means lifting of the stay-at-home order and certain business closures
for “aggressive mitigation,” and green signifies further lifting of restrictions with national
guidelines from the Centers of Disease Control (CDC) and state guidelines from the Pennsylvania
Department of Health to be closely followed and enforced at state and local level.10
According to the Governor’s Office, “decisions and actions were taken on a state, county, and
regional basis in coordination with local elected officials, public health experts, and other
stakeholders.”11 However, on the weekend of May 9-10, there was a showdown between Governor
Wolf and several counties of the Commonwealth that unilaterally announced their intention to
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defy the governor’s extended COVID-19 stay-at-home order and to decide themselves when they
were going to open.12 At the same time, several local law-enforcement agencies declared they
would not continue to enforce certain business closure orders, and some local leaders said they
would not let township police enforce the Governor’s order without their express approval.13
As several counties went ahead to announce that they would move from the “red” to the “yellow”
phase based on their own, not the governor’s decision, Governor Wolf issued a remarkably harsh
response using the federal and state funding stick as well as some martial language. For example,
in public statements and through news media, he accused certain state senators and county
commissioners of acting “cowardly” and “choosing to desert in the face of the enemy.”14 Most of
the counties backed down and one approach taken was to establish a local reopening commission
that assessed the business impact of extended closures and a possible way forward in line with the
Governor’s guidance. That approach in turn was met with criticism from African-American leaders,
who were not initially represented on that commission.15
On May 15, protesters who were members of the ReOpen PA group which at that time comprised
around 85,000 concerned citizens rallied around the Pennsylvania State Capitol in Harrisburg, PA,
joined by citizens associated with like-minded groups from across the Commonwealth.16
In early July, while some cities expressed their deep disappointment about not being allowed
by the Governor to move to the “green” phase, other cities, such as Philadelphia, constructed
their own “modified green” phase, to complete confusion. As Philadelphia Health Commissioner
Thomas Farley clarified—although the Governor was sending the city to “green,” Philadelphia
determined the city did not currently meet all the metrics for that; hence, the hometown
of Independence Hall announced its own schedule for reopening17 that Governor Wolf
subsequently endorsed.18
By mid-July, all counties had formally moved to the “green” phase. This “greening” might have
sent the wrong signal to some parts of the population and since then, an increase in COVID-19
cases has been seen. Already on July 1, Health Secretary Rachel Levine had issued an order
requiring all Pennsylvanians to wear masks whenever they leave home; on July 15, the Governor
and the Health Secretary additionally issued “Targeted Mitigation” orders, reprimanding the
irresponsible behavior of some parts of the public and among other things putting occupancy
limitations on bars and nightclubs as well as requiring teleworking wherever possible.19
Governor Wolf and Secretary of Health Levine led the Commonwealth’s response, with little
to no visible involvement of county and local-level emergency management agencies. The
narrative centered on the “flatten the curve” slogan, with the rationale changing over time
from a flattened curve buying time to prevent the health sector from being overwhelmed
with an influx of COVID-19 patients to a flattened curve actually reducing the total number
of infected people and saving lives. As was characteristic of the response elsewhere in the
U.S. (as well at the federal level) the Department of Health quickly assumed ownership of the
crisis and integrated it from the coordinating agency (in line with Emergency Support Function
[ESF] 8 according to the National Response Framework)20 to the lead agency. As has been the
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case in the United States’ COVID-19 response overall, public health sector leadership was
vociferous early on with its claims and interest in massive protection of its own sector of critical
infrastructure, preferring a risk elimination approach over the risk management approach that
characterizes homeland security policy and strategy.21
To note, at the federal level, “under the direction of the White House Coronavirus Task Force,
FEMA moved from playing a supporting role in assisting the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), which was designated as the initial lead federal agency for the response,
to directing it.”22 The federal response uses the model of a “Unified Coordination Group” that is
made up of the FEMA Administrator, the HHS [Health and Human Services] Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response, and a CDC [Centers for Disease Control]
representative—which has responsibility for operational command, leadership, and
decision-making for the COVID-19 pandemic response. The three leaders are partners
in operational decision-making for the response and provide input to the White House
Coronavirus Task Force.23

Discussion

Crisis Management
In the Three Mile Island nuclear accident of 1979, Pennsylvania Governor Dick Thornburgh had
used what he later on characterized as a pluralistic crisis management style of “trusted adhocracy.”24 Within that style, moral authorities in crisis response and crisis communication, such
as subject-matter expert—but not technocrat—Herold Denton, emerged as the crisis evolved,
and that came with a lot of inherent legitimacy and capability for subject matter expertisebased “intelligent social control.”25 Aiming at a more integrated response, which is in line
with the National Response Framework, and using a lead (rather than coordinating) agency
approach, Governor Wolf instilled a maximum of crisis governance power in his Health Secretary
Levine— resulting in the creation of of a sole moral agent who can’t be legitimately criticized
or otherwise challenged. A Professor of Pediatrics and Psychiatry at the Penn State College of
Medicine who previously served as Pennsylvania’s Physician General, Levine symbolizes the
data-driven and research-informed approach of the state to the COVID-19 response.
However, as Naomi Zach and the disaster ethics paradigm would posit, the “common good”—
Rousseau’s concept of what brings benefit to all of society—cannot be determined by number
crunching.26 A public health metrics-focused data-driven approach to COVID-19 is limited
by two factors. First, a common shortcoming is that only pandemic data and projections
seem to be used, with no adequately comprehensive set of indicators applied that would,
among others, also include business recovery and social life data.27 Second, from a homeland
security perspective, the public health sector needs to include cross-agency training and
communication, community involvement, and be able to build its response efforts on an
established pre-disaster routine.28
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In bioethics, the tendency of public health sciences and practice to focus on risk avoidance (as
opposed to risk management, ) has been criticized.29 At the same time, risk personalization is
integral to effective public warning systems and strategies. However, it becomes difficult when “a
personal understanding of what was meant by the warning” is difficult for people to form.30 When
public crisis communication is fixated on infection counts, hospital beds and ventilator numbers,
as well as sometimes wild extrapolations on case numbers, it makes risk personalization difficult
and enhances the ‘it won’t happen here/it won’t happen to me’ effect,31 thus de-incentivizing
public compliance with behavioral mandates such as mask wearing. Therefore, it is not surprising
that the Governor and the Health Secretary needed to add several targeted mitigation orders on
top of each other in an effort to tackle compliance issues.

Preparedness Gap
If the COVID-19 response is research-based, it should not be overwhelmed by the unexpected,
as the Pennsylvania response was, by the the “Reopen Pennsylvania” campaign .32 The
situation Pennsylvania found itself in was not beyond imagination, and neither has it been
beyond expectation. As noted by Peter Hough, “as with famines and hunger, however, major
epidemics and pandemics (international epidemics) of diseases represent only dramatic
periodic escalations of an underlying and persistent threat.”33 According to the National
Biodefense Strategy of 2018, under its Goal 1, “the United States will build risk awareness at the
strategic level, through analyses and research efforts to characterize deliberate, accidental, and
natural biological risks”—the related objective being to “ensure decision-making is informed
by intelligence, forecasting, and risk assessment.”34 In fact, pandemic planning models and
scenarios have covered COVID-19-like and worse pandemics for almost as long as the homeland
security enterprise has existed.
According to the Centers of Disease Control (CDC), at the time of the finalization of this article
(September 24, 2020), there have been 6,916,292 total cases of COVID-19 and 201,411 deaths
attributed to COVID-19 in the U.S., of which 2 percent of the cases (153,397) and 4 percent of
the death toll (8,079) have fallen upon Pennsylvania.35 Worldwide, according to the World Health
Organization (WHO), there were 31,664,104 cases and 972,221 deaths as of September 24, 2020.36
In the National Planning Scenarios of 2005, “Scenario 3: Biological Disease Outbreak—Pandemic
Influenza”37 portrays a hypothetical public health emergency with 85,000 fatalities in the U.S.
(which the COVID-19 pandemic has far exceeded), and 300,000 hospitalizations, which is in the
dimension of the cumulative number of COVID-19-related hospitalizations nation-wide which
had surpassed 300,000 on July 29, 2020, reaching 400,840 by September 24.38 As a result, based
on the scenario assumptions, the load on the health sector has been within the forecast range
and hence should not have been unanticipated.
As well, the challenge of concurrent public health and public policy crises (such as the George
Floyd protests and civil unrest39) has been as anticipated in scenario foresight. In the Rockefeller
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Foundation’s “Lock Step” scenario developed in 2010, a new influenza virus kills 8 million people
worldwide (COVID-19 so far having killed close to 1 million) and some governments’ overbroad
response starts to threaten civil liberties and democratic values, evoking mass protest.40
As another example: The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC),
conducted a pandemic influenza preparedness study. Its planning model estimation was that a
catastrophic pandemic would overwhelm the nation’s healthcare capabilities in seven to ten weeks,
with the healthcare sector going out of capacity and having to reject 3 to 4 million patients.41
Moreover, state-of-the-art reviews had identified health policy as an emerging “key element of
building resilience.”42 At the textbook level, “catastrophic pandemic” scenarios including related
ethical decision-making challenges have been covered as well.43 We have been teaching our
students for quite some time the catastrophic character of a potential crisis like the COVID-19
pandemic , and now we find out that due to the systemic risks of our “‘just-in-time delivery’
economy, the United States has insufficient surge capacity for health care, some food supplies,
and many other products and services.”44

Crisis Communication
Governor Wolf’s and Secretary Levine’s crisis communication style has been straightforward,
which comes with its advantages and disadvantages. When public compliance challenges are
anticipated, clamorous crisis communication can increase peoples’ following of behavioral
mandates because it interrupts normal routine and instills a sound sense of emergency where
environmental clues are absent,45 such as with a virus that cannot be seen On the other
hand, following the “homeland security vision,”46 crisis management policy and politics should
themselves bear resemblance to the principles of the American Way of Life and the massive
democratic experiment it relies on. This however has not always been the case in Pennsylvania’s
COVID-19 response.
The governor’s questionable personification of the novel coronavirus as an “enemy” that
Pennsylvanians must courageously stand together to defeat, however is an expression of longstanding U.S. national security culture. As such, it may even be seen as an effective communicative
crisis management strategy because as James Sperling argues, “Americans require a palpable
existential threat to conduct a purposeful security policy; there appear to be no permanent
interests independent of the threat posed by a malevolent ‘other’.”47 However, because of that,
in political and public discourse, homeland security policies can easily be militarized.48 Defense
support of civil authorities and homeland defense being essential, the broader public still tends to
confuse homeland security as a civil security and law-enforcement based enterprise, centered on
a whole-community approach, with national defense and its kinetic approach. This misconception
also is present in Pennsylvanians’ minds.49 Therefore, using martial metaphors to solicit a unified
county and community response may be penny-wise but pound-foolish if one looks at the
COVID-19 response as an aspect of the homeland security mission set.

Homeland Security Affairs

|

Special Covid-19 Issue 2020 | WWW.HSAJ.ORG

8

Pennsylvania’s COVID-19 Response vs. Homeland Security
Frameworks and Research: Masking the Whole Community
By Alexander Siedschlag

It was also predictable that in the COVID-19 crisis, the Governor’s Office and the Department
of Health’s response would be confronted by some state lawmakers, local government,
and members of the public because as Richard Sylves asserts, “emergency management
is conducted in an American political culture. Therefore it is often challenged by people’s
fundamental distrust of government planning efforts”.50 Moreover, it is neither unusual nor
egregious but normal for crisis management to involve “politics of crisis management” as
crises put “public leadership under pressure” and public crisis management is not a secretive
expert responsibility but an open governance challenge.51 Yet Pennsylvania’s public health
administration’s reaction to such challenges has been confrontational and seemingly partisan
at times. Not shy about making political statements, as a state administrator, Health Secretary
Levine has been seen by her critics as lacking the democratic legitimacy to do so.52 The following
press release of June 22, 2020 is indicative of the problem.
Against the advice of public health experts and against orders from Gov. Wolf and
Sec. of Health Dr. Rachel Levine aimed at keeping Pennsylvanians healthy, Lebanon
County commissioners voted 2 to 1 along party lines to prematurely reopen in late
May. Now, the county is facing an uptick in cases, and is unable to move to green.
Lebanon County’s partisan, politically driven decision to ignore public health experts
and reopen prematurely is having severe consequences for the health and safety of
county residents,” Dr. Levine said. “Case counts have escalated and the county is not yet
ready to be reopened. Lebanon County has hindered its progress by reopening too early.
Because of this irresponsible decision, Lebanon County residents are at greater risk of
contracting COVID-19.53
Otherwise worthy of criticism, a strength of this communication is that it emphasizes the ‘It ain’t
over till it’s over’ principle, criticizing premature political action of crisis termination.54 However,
the adversarial communication style represented by this statement is an example of public
health technocracy confronting public policy choices. In Pennsylvania, county commissioners
are elected politicians and the Health Secretary is an appointed public servant. As Sylves
points out, “[t]he ethos of U.S. emergency management” includes an “emphasis on grassroots
local emergency management in emergencies and disasters with overhead governments
providing help but not taking command or control of local emergency response and recovery
operations.”55 As Pitirim A. Sorokin concluded in Man and Society and Calamity (1942),
calamities come with a “general increase of governmental control” and a corresponding need to
emphasize constitutional rights and liberties as well as to practice democratic institutionalism in
the public administration of the catastrophe.56
Pennsylvania’s reopening plan was divided into a red, a yellow, and a green phase. Other states,
for example New York, use a numbered phases system that may be a better model. Homeland
security studies have found color-coded risk communication systems ineffective, the Homeland
Security Advisory System (HSAS) being the most prominent example. It was replaced with the
more detailed National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) as under HSAS too much context
needed to be provided separately to equip the public with actionable information.57 In fact,
Homeland Security Affairs
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Governor Wolf has been busy explaining the details and meaning of the color-coded system on
his social media outlets. An additional complication stems from the fact that some jurisdictions
within the Commonwealth have added their own variant of a more restricted “green phase.”
This is a good example of disaster research’s long-standing finding that, as semiotics calls it,
indexical signs are not enough to transmit behavioral instructions effectively.58

CONCLUSION
As Mike Bourne argues, “[h]omeland security first and foremost seeks to secure not just survival
but ways of life.”59 While ensuring resilience to catastrophic disaster is a core homeland security
mission, seldom in the era of modern democracy have so few restricted so many so much as in
the COVID-19 response. Also, with problematic gubernatorial communication , those affected
can easily be deprived of fair voice opportunity and crisis communication can have too much of
a top-down orientation.
First of all, a global lesson learned from COVID-19 so far also applies to Pennsylvania, as Mami
Mizutori points out:
“Risk has become systemic. It cannot be divided into categories that are then assigned
to health authorities, disaster management agencies or early warning centres. If
governments continue to operate in this way, the bigger picture as a disaster unfolds will
remain unseen and the solutions will not be fit for purpose.”60
Pennsylvania has yet to fully make the step from disaster to catastrophe as the characteristic
challenge to U.S. emergency management in our century. Response to a catastrophic crisis
cannot be chopped into separate silos of responsibility, 61 and it must be able and willing to
reform itself in action, being responsive to and appreciative of the whole community and its
evolving concerns and needs.
That said, the Keystone State’s response exemplifies broader national issues. An example
of those is the switching of preparedness planning to a capability-based approach after the
Hurricane Katrina experience and the advent of the whole-community principle.62 We now
know how the capability-based approach can work against the whole-community approach:
namely, in situations such as the COVID-19 response, where an isolated focus was laid on
sustaining certain health sector capabilities in the face of worst-case scenarios of numbers of
infected people requiring hospitalization and intensive care. Such a response of protecting the
healthcare system at virtually any cost, based on needs assessments derived from statistical
modeling, is not consistent with the National Preparedness Goal “in a manner that allows
our interests, aspirations, and way of life to thrive.”63 In a public-health context as well, “all
security involves trade-offs,”64 and, as United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres also
reminded us, the best approach is one that responds proportionately to immediate threats
while protecting human rights and the rule of law. More than ever, governments must be
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transparent, responsive and accountable. Civic space and press freedom are critical. Civil society
organizations and the private sector have essential roles to play. And in all we do, let’s never
forget: The threat is the virus, not people.65
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